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A B S T R A C T
This article uses an ecological economics approach to analyse tensions surrounding efforts to phase out mercury
in Indonesia's artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) sector, among the largest sources of mercury pol-
lution worldwide. Many scholars and environmental activists have long hoped that global restrictions in mercury
trade would drive up mercury prices and decrease mercury use and pollution in ASGM. However, in Indonesia,
despite global mercury trade restrictions, recent increases in domestic mercury supplies through new cinnabar
mining developments have made mercury less expensive and more available, destabilizing efforts at reducing
mercury use. This article discusses implications of domestic cinnabar mining for controlling mercury in
Indonesia's ASGM sector, highlighting obstacles to implementing the Minamata Convention, a treaty that aims to
restrict mercury use. We link discussion of mercury mining to other socioeconomic processes, labour relations
and power dynamics shaping mercury use in gold mining and hindering collectivised mercury-free technology
uptake. Examining new evidence regarding the social metabolism of a changing extractive economy, we un-
derscore why an integrated ecological economics paradigm – carefully grounding analysis in the context of local
labour situations – is needed to challenge assumptions and inform new strategies for mercury reduction/elim-
ination in ASGM.
1. Introduction
Over the past decade, scholars addressing mercury pollution have
drawn attention to the proliferation of contaminated sites in artisanal
and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) areas globally, employing a
variety of approaches to studying the social and ecological costs of
pollution (Li et al., 2009; Bose-O'Reilly et al., 2010; Telmer and Veiga,
2009). There has also been a significant body of literature on technol-
ogies for reducing mercury use in gold extraction (García et al., 2015;
Appel and Na-Oy, 2012) as well as socioeconomic influences on gold
mining practices (Spiegel, 2009; Spiegel, 2012a; Hilson, 2006;
Dondeyne and Ndunguru, 2014; Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 2013). How-
ever, there has been a paucity of literature, particularly in Asia, fo-
cusing on relationships between mercury production, trade flows,
mercury use in ASGM and the inter-connectedness of different ex-
tractive processes along gold/mercury commodity chains and their as-
sociated labour and power dynamics. In this paper, we focus on chal-
lenges in reducing mercury pollution in Indonesia's ASGM sector. After
years of inter-governmental debates culminating in the Minamata
Convention on Mercury (UNEP, 2013a), the Government of Indonesia
announced its plan to phase out mercury use in ASGM completely by
2018. Signed by Indonesia and more than 120 other countries, the
Minamata Convention stipulates that countries with “more than insig-
nificant” ASGM activity develop National Action Plans for this sector,
including measures to control mercury trade, capacity-building to raise
risk-awareness and support cleaner technology adoption in ASGM
communities, formalization or regulation of ASGM, and other measures
that emerged after years of extensive inter-governmental negotiation
(Fritz et al., 2016; Selin, 2014a; Selin, 2014b; Clifford, 2014; Spiegel
et al., 2015; Sippl, 2015). We explore the ecological economics of
mercury phase-out for the ASGM sector, highlighting a need to rethink
assumptions underlying past market- and technology-centred solutions
and carefully link analysis of mercury trade dynamics, institutional
regulatory strategies and regional socioeconomic processes that shape
on-going mercury use in gold mining areas.
Bringing attention to ecological implications of global trade,
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researchers and environmentalists have long argued that curtailing the
international trade of mercury should have the effect of increasing
mercury prices and reducing mercury use in all sectors, especially gold
mining (Hylander, 2001). However, notwithstanding the ethical im-
portance of international mercury trade restrictions, there have also
been cautionary warnings that strict mercury trade bans could have the
unintended effect of leading to new illegal mercury stockpiling and il-
legal dealing, thus accentuating the need for new attention to these
“unofficial” dynamics – and the socioeconomic relationships in which
they are embedded (Spiegel et al., 2005; Clifford, 2014). As Greer et al.
(2006) noted, “It is crucially important that any mercury reduction
strategy ratchet down supply and demand in a coordinated manner.
This will ensure that steps taken to reduce demand do not flood the
market with excess mercury supplies, which would invite mismanage-
ment. Similarly it will ensure that a plummet in supply does not trigger
a re-opening of already closed primary mines to meet unsatisfied de-
mand” (p. 108). In this article we provide analysis of how, despite
mercury export bans by previously significant global mercury suppliers
– namely the U.S. and the European Union – and global commitments to
phase out mercury use, increases in domestic mercury supplies through
new cinnabar mining (HgS) developments in Indonesia have made
mercury less expensive and more available to small-scale gold miners
across the country, destabilizing efforts at reducing mercury use and
pollution. Discussing implications of recent domestic cinnabar mining
for mercury use in Indonesia's ASGM sector, we stress the need for an
ecological economics perspective that positions the implications of new
mercury mining within Indonesia as part of a broader set of concerns
about material flows, labour and power relations, and the social me-
tabolism that underpins extractive economy developments (Martinez-
Alier et al., 2010; Muradian et al., 2012). We also highlight key insights
acquired from engaged research in small-scale mining communities
during projects aiming to build capacities to reduce mercury use,
agreeing with Muradian and Cardenas (2015) about the need to criti-
cally re-conceptualise environmental governance challenges not as
“technical” problems but as “collective action dilemmas” that are
nested in, and influenced by, broader social processes and value sys-
tems.
In understanding social and ecological processes in the extractive
sector, Martinez-Alier and Walter (2016) articulate the importance of
understanding links between unequal property rights, inequalities of
power, pollution burdens and how access to natural resources are un-
equally distributed. We examine some of these links in areas of In-
donesia where mining activities are booming, thus offering a country-
specific analysis of key challenges and processes hindering the im-
plementation of Article 7 of the Minamata Convention, which mandates
that signatories “shall take steps to reduce, and where feasible elim-
inate, the use of mercury and mercury compounds in, and the releases
to the environment of mercury from, such [gold] mining and proces-
sing” (Article 7, Paragraph 2). The first section below provides back-
ground of mercury use in Indonesia's ASGM sector, contextualizing how
Indonesia's signing of the Minamata Convention represents a moment
for invigorating focus on inequities in the gold mining sector. The next
section discusses our methodology and analytical approach. This is
followed by analysis of recent increases in domestic mercury mining
and trade, and its implications for the economics of mercury use in
ASGM across Indonesia. The final section builds on papers in Ecological
Economics by Saldarriaga-Isaza et al. (2015a, 2015b) to highlight a need
for strategies of mercury phase-out that closely engage socioeconomic
and labour relations surrounding “cheap mercury” and “free mercury”
as well as critical lessons learned from past efforts to support co-
operatives as a means of replacing mercury use in ASGM with alter-
native technologies. In particular, our field experiences in Java and
Kalimantan reinforce the concern that “rendering society technical” (Li,
2011) perilously neglects complex economic and power dynamics sur-
rounding unequal access to ASGM legalisation opportunities – dynamics
that inhibit local groups from transforming extraction technology. We
call for careful understanding of inter-linked socioeconomic relations
and power dynamics that shape technology choices, material flows and
mercury use practices.
2. Contextualizing the Ecological Economics of ASGM and
Mercury in Indonesia
Globally, much environmental scholarship has stressed that ASGM
is one of the world's largest sources of mercury emissions and that new
interventions are urgently needed in this sector (Veiga et al., 2014a;
Davies, 2014; Swain et al., 2007; Sippl and Selin, 2012). Indonesia is
recognized by the United Nations as the world's third largest mercury
emitter after China and India, with reports warning that mercury use
and pollution in Indonesia's ASGM sector has been increasing sig-
nificantly over the past two decades (IPEN, 2015; Balifokus, 2015;
Spiegel and Veiga, 2006). Addressing the period immediately before
Indonesia signed the Minamata Convention on Mercury, Ismawati
(2014) examined how US$32 million in mercury was exported to In-
donesia in 2012, largely for use in ASGM, noting a long-term correla-
tion between the upward global gold prices and increased mercury
imports into Indonesia between 1998 and 2012. The selection of 2018
for a complete mercury phase-out was the Indonesian Government's
own target, not a globally “required” target, and speaks to the urgency
with which some government authorities have approached pollution in
ASGM in policy announcements. Yet, while its ambitious pollution
phase-out target has been welcomed by some, government announce-
ments regarding Indonesia's mercury plans have already elicited a
range of sceptical responses. As one prominent Indonesian en-
vironmentalist noted, “Indonesia is the first to publish its national ac-
tion plan…But it was made in a rush and did not involve other stake-
holders” (quoted in Mongabay, 2015), highlighting a problem of not
investing enough time and resources into vital participatory processes.
Critiques have been levied by environmental activists that Indonesia's
National Action Plan is not compliant with the Minamata Convention
and does not follow Annex C guidelines; and concerns about minimal
participation have also been voiced by Indonesia's National Association
of Community Miners, which has argued that the government's failure
to legalise ASGM is the single greatest challenge that obstructs plans for
significant mercury reduction, leaving technology planning to occur in
a largely informal context that lacks regulatory support (Lestaripost,
2015). Further concerns have been raised that Indonesia is currently
importing significant quantities of mercury “under the table” and
“backed by powerful officials” (Ismawati, 2014), creating trade rela-
tions that could be difficult to police even if Indonesia's government
authorities wanted to reduce mercury importing officially.
Across Indonesia, artisanal and small-scale gold mining activities
provide livelihoods to more than one million people, spanning 27
provinces (Balifokus, 2015). In broad technical terms, there are two
types of ASGM - hard rock gold mining (primary ore) and alluvial gold
mining (secondary ore) - each involving a range of ore types (and
grades), technologies, mercury management practices and socio-
economic dynamics. Mercury is more heavily used in hard rock gold
mining than in alluvial gold mining, although both types of ASGM can
result in significant mercury pollution and toxic exposure (Bose-O'Reilly
et al., 2010; UNEP, 2013b). National news media coverage in Indonesia
has widely stressed that ASGM “costs the nation millions” (Nainggolan,
2015), highlighting ecological and health consequences of toxic con-
tamination. Yet, much like in other countries where mercury has been
thought of as an “agent of poverty” in the ASGM sector (Hilson and
Pardie, 2006), studies have shown that alternative (mercury-free)
technologies (e.g. direct cyanidation) usually require a higher order of
economic capital investment and technical training as well as different
labour and revenue-sharing relationships, while mercury amalgamation
is generally the quickest, least expensive and easiest to manage gold
recovery method for individual miners (Veiga et al., 2014a; Spiegel and
Veiga, 2010).
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The notion of mercury as an “agent of poverty” can have varying si-
tuated meanings depending on the context. Financial and technology dy-
namics of the ASGM sector are embedded in complex social, economic and
political relationships. In some cases, “poverty” is linked to inequities as-
sociated with gold processing activities driven by powerful actors who can
(depending on the situation) make or influence key technological choices
and extraction practices, including wealthy businessmen (from the mining
regions or from other cities) who may serve as land owners and equipment
owners as well as gold shop owners and police (Agrawal, 2007; Spiegel,
2012b; Peluso, 2016). Mercury is also an “agent of poverty” in the sense
that its use can be dependent on injustices linked to social marginalisation
and territorial conflict; past studies addressing other country contexts sug-
gest that mercury pollution risks can increase when small-scale gold miners
have no secure, formally recognized access to resource rights and are treated
indiscriminately as “criminals” by companies and government agents
(Tschakert and Singha, 2007; Spiegel et al., 2015).1
Regardless of which social actors drive technology choices and how
these relations may be understood, the Minamata Convention requires
signatory governments to establish actions to eradicate the four most ha-
zardous practices of mercury usage in ASGM: whole ore amalgamation,
open burning of amalgam or processed amalgam; burning of amalgam in
residential areas; and cyanide leaching of ore or tailings to which mercury
has been added (UNEP, 2013a). While the Indonesian Government's
publicly articulated commitment is to eliminate all mercury use in ASGM
by 2018, other countries have recently announced plans to adopt a more
gradual approach by not seeking to “eliminate” all mercury use so quickly,
with the intention of using a combination of “reduction” with “elimina-
tion” plans for the most hazardous practices (The Herald, 2016). Debates
about mercury in Indonesia are thus occurring in the context of significant
global debate in which mercury is recognized as both a serious trans-
boundary pollutant and a globally traded product that has a long history of
being exported – controversially – from wealthy countries to poorer
countries (Selin, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; Veiga and Marshall, 2016; Veiga
et al., 2006).
Numerous studies have found excessive use of mercury to amalga-
mate the whole ore in ball mills (Ismawati, 2014) and significant re-
leases of mercury into the air and water, documenting ecological costs
and health costs from mercury exposure – in many/most cases very
significantly exceeding the level declared safe by the World Health
Organisation (Arifin et al., 2015). Hundreds of severely contaminated
hot spots have been identified, including some of the most polluted
places in the world, with Balifokus Foundation reporting that the
number of ASGM hot spots in Indonesia almost doubled between 2010
and 2015 (Balifokus, 2015). Concerns have generated a vast body of
research and environmental monitoring, including much detailed work
on the impact of mercury in or near amalgamation tailing ponds and
discharge sites (Krisnayanti et al., 2012; Palapa and Maramis, 2015)
and downstream ecological cost assessment (Castilhos et al., 2006). The
need for both international mercury trade controls and local education-
oriented approaches to reduce mercury use in mining communities has
been recognized by Indonesia's government, as reflected in preparatory
documents designed to create its National Action Plan for ASGM as part
of the Minamata Convention, however the socioeconomic barriers to
mercury phase-out have generated less literature in Indonesia and less
attention in the National Action Plan. Although Annex C of the Con-
vention lists measures to educate miners and the public about mercury
risks, introduce alternative technologies and regulate ASGM, treaty
implementation trajectories that fail to break from extractive sector
dynamics that perpetuate inequities and marginalise the most im-
poverished actors in the sector have to be viewed with caution (Spiegel
et al., 2015; Spiegel, 2017). As with other global treaties that give
“flexibility” to signatories, the Minamata Convention's requirements
leave considerable space for interpretation at the country level, beck-
oning a rethinking of the inter-linked ecological and economic re-
lationships that need to be understood in planning and implementation
processes.
3. Methodology and Analytic Approach
Our analysis draws on field experiences of the authorship team across
multiple settings, including critical insights acquired during action research
in gold mining areas in South Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Central
Java, East Java and West Java over a period of 10 years. Our methodology
draws particularly on synthesizing lessons from the experiences of several of
the authors with the Indonesian organisation Yayasan Tambuhak Sinta
(YTS), that since the mid-2000s has participated in interventions focusing
on assisting small-scale gold miners to reduce mercury use, exposure and
pollution. The projects YTS implemented took place in diverse locales in-
cluding remote gold mining locations in forests and degraded lands (where
gold-contaminated tailings are released into the ground and streams) as well
as urban gold shops in towns (where mercury from gold‑mercury amalgams
is released in vapour form), with United Nations agencies' support. During
technology training demonstrations on-site with small-scale gold miners as
well as interviews off-site, questions were asked about socioeconomic and
technological challenges associated with phasing out mercury use and the
perceived national planning priorities for addressing challenges. Follow-up
questions – in some cases several months after the interventions finished –
helped to monitor on-going challenges articulated by people involved in
ASGM. Synthesis of lessons learned from research in these projects was
supplemented by insights gained when some of the authors were involved
in workshops with government officials to help develop the National Action
Plans for ASGM and on-going interactions with officials involved with the
implementation of the Minamata Convention. Our analysis was also in-
formed by analysing documents from the UN and Indonesian government.
Extensive discussions were also held with mercury traders, including tra-
veling with a bulk mercury trader to ASGM sites.
The approach guiding our analysis draws on Martinez-Alier et al.'s
(2010) discussion of social metabolism and material flows in extractive
sector economies, encouraging a shift away from thinking in narrow terms
about technological and social variables in order to appreciate complex and
changing processes that underpin inter-linked ecological degradation and
economic inequities. By “social metabolism” Martinez-Alier et al. (2010)
refer to “the manner in which human societies organize their growing ex-
changes of energy and materials with the environment” articulating as a
starting premise of analysis “the understanding that economic change
generally occurs for the benefit of some groups and at the expense of other
existing or future groups,” and stressing the relevance of inequalities of
power, land rights, resource access and income. Lamenting that many re-
search networks on mining and other resources communicate their research
“without bridges to the research on conflicts on transport and waste dis-
posal,” Martinez-Allier's work has galvanized considerable attention in the
field of ecological economics on material flows, power dynamics and eco-
logical distribution conflicts as well as modes of resistance to the extractive
sector generally (Conde, 2017). Our analysis is also informed by a seminal
paper published in Ecological Economics more than 15 years ago in which
Marieke Heemskerk explored the economics of ASGM that affect the deci-
sions of miners regarding which technology to adopt. Her study argued that
technology choices and gold production practices in Suriname were often
not influenced by official mining regulations or the market price of mercury
– as is sometimes assumed – because “mercury accounted for only 1–2% of
monthly production expenses” (Heemskerk, 2001, p. 300) for low-income
gold miners. Documenting how restrictive governance measures to control
gold miners' practices and mercury trade have often been fruitless,
Heemskerk called for more comprehensive research and policy approaches
that are attuned to social and economic constraints in mining communities
(see also Heemskerk, 2005).
More recent studies in Ecological Economics have elaborated on ecolo-
gical economics paradigms for understanding ASGM in Colombia –
1 See Gamu et al. (2015) for wider review of the potential ways in which mining can
contribute to poverty alleviation and/or exacerbation.
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highlighting the need for considering “collective” strategies for promoting
cleaner gold production and examining processes of forming cooperatives
(among small-scale miners) that might facilitate technology transfer away
from mercury use (Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 2015a; Saldarriaga-Isaza et al.,
2015b). Characterizing the technological choices miners in ASGM have to
make as fitting the definition of a “public-good dilemma” of a common-pool
socio-ecological systems resource, Saldarriaga-Isaza et al. (2013) explained
that the technological decision facing miners involves a trade-off in which
miners may choose mercury amalgamation - the cheapest and easiest-to-
handle technique available – in order to maximize short-term individual
profits, but in the long-run, the entire ASGM community, which includes
these individual miners, is worse off than with the choice of a cleaner and
more productive technology. Exploring how cooperative management can
encourage access to cleaner and more productive technologies, the authors
also noted that support from external parties “could help miners to break
out of the vicious cycle in which they are trapped, due to, inter alia, mercury
utilization” and they called for “training in the operation of new equipment,
education programs, and other policies that focus on the access and switch
to better practices, and campaigns to foster social capital.” Citing Cardenas
et al. (2002), they also pointed to experimental evidence that inequality
affects decisions in public-good dilemmas and called for further research
into other factors that affect choices relevant to mercury reduction. Our
approach, developed in the sections below, provides scrutiny to two parti-
cular areas – new material flows of mercury due to cinnabar mining and the
embedded nature of mercury use in particular power-laden socioeconomic
relationships in gold mining regions – described respectively in the next two
sections.
4. Implications of New Mercury Production from Cinnabar Mining
Despite the assumption - and hope - held by academics (e.g. Hylander,
2001) that global restrictions on the trade of mercury would lead to greater
difficulties in accessing mercury, higher mercury prices and thus reductions
in mercury use,2 the economy of mercury use that has developed in In-
donesia3 presents a contradictory picture. We have found that in recent
years mercury prices for gold miners in Indonesia have been falling sig-
nificantly, not increasing, and that this is the case in large part because of
recent increases in domestic cinnabar mining and mercury production. A
vivid illustration of why this is came from Darma (a pseudonym), a mercury
trader in Jakarta who has been trading mercury for the past 4 years, who
was interviewed for this study in Jakarta and West Java. In an interview in
November 2016, he explained that every week, a non-commercial airplane
delivers mercury mined from Seram Island in Maluku Province to Jakarta,
supplying several tonnes at a time. He explained that he usually buys and
trades 3 t of mercury per week4 and that theMalukumercury mine has been
a major source of economic change locally and a key contributor to cheap
mercury supplies throughout Indonesia, from Java to Kalimantan and be-
yond, with most of the mercury ultimately used for small-scale gold ex-
traction. Production at the particular cinnabar mining area described by
Darma is estimated at 20 t of mercury per month, involving at least 1000
workers. More broadly, another interviewee noted that there are more than
30005 workers in the cinnabar mining operations in the Seram region,
producing approximately 700 t of cinnabar ore - at least 50% of which is
mercury - per year, bringing estimated mercury production from this region
to at least 350 t per year (in recent years).
Cinnabar miners in this region are mostly former artisanal and small-
scale gold miners who left gold mining after a large-scale gold mining
company came to their area and pressured them to leave. Both interviewees
above explained that mercury prices have decreased significantly over the
past 5 years due to these new domestic mercury supplies, that powerful
people (with connections to the army) have economic interests in mercury
trading and that attempts by the Ministry of Environment to curtail the
mercury production could therefore be met with resistance. What does the
future hold for mercury mining and trading? What impacts will this have on
national plans to reduce mercury use in gold mining? Small-scale miners in
the region believe that mercury mining and trade is likely to continue as
long as powerful actors support it (even if some government officials do
not).
While these accounts of cinnabar mining give context for understanding
how unlikely it is that the government's “2018” mercury phase-out target
can be reached (unless very rapid actions are taken to better control the
flow of mercury from cinnabar mining and shut down such operations, for
example), they also illustrate how new domestic mercury production since
2012 has been reconfiguring the social metabolism that connects different
parts of the extractive economy. In the region of Maluku that Darma de-
scribed, the cinnabar that is extracted is estimated to be (in some cases) as
high as 65% mercury, producing new economies of manufacturing in other
islands in Indonesia. According to Darma in 2016, often 75% of the cin-
nabar from that particular area was being brought to the Jakarta-West Java
area for processing (to liquid mercury) before being sent elsewhere for use
in gold mining, while the other 25%was being sent to Surabaya (East Java),
where it is also being processed for use for gold mining. The transport of
cinnabar between Maluku and Java is often by boat but also - in some cases
- by airplane. Issues of domestic mercury production and trade have barely
been reported in the news media due to their covert nature and their recent
emergence (just over the past five years), but televised news pieces in 2017
have explained how mercury-rich cinnabar mined in Maluku makes its way
to Surabaya (by boat) and then to several processing areas in Java Island
including some 60 processing furnaces in Sukabumi, in West Java, where
mercury processors – like gold miners – are facing severe levels of toxic
exposure.6 A recent NGO report suggests that 30 cinnabar distilleries in
Sukabumi are producing “at least 36 tons of elemental mercury per day”
(Balifokus, 2017, p. 34).7 Another interviewee in our study noted in April
2017 that regions in Maluku – specifically, Ambon City and Seram – have
also seen the development of mercury processing activities between De-
cember 2016 and April 2017, indicating that there has been an increasingly
diversified network of processing areas. The television piece on Sukabumi
noted - as Darma (and other sources) also articulated - that for gold miners,
prices of mercury have been decreasing significantly due to these new
mercury supplies. Darma describes the price of unprocessed cinnabar ore as
being 100,000 Rupiah per kg ($7.5 USD); whereas mercury extracted from
the cinnabar stone is sold for between 250,000 Rupiah ($18.75 USD) and
500,000 Rupiah ($37.50 USD) per kg. By contrast, he reported that im-
ported mercury from Germany, Spain8 and other countries costs up to 1.6
million Rupiah ($120.00 USD) per kg.
Corroborating the above accounts, we collected evidence in other parts
of Indonesia where, in 2016, mercury was available at significantly lower
prices than several years previously. For example, in Murung Raya District
in Central Kalimantan, mercury was said by local small-scale gold miners to
have cost one million Rupiah per kilogram in 2007 but they were paying
only half a million Rupiah ($40.00 USD) per kilogram in November 2016.
2 As discussed by Spiegel et al. (2005), mercury prices internationally had tripled in the
years prior to a European Union-led effort to curb global mercury trade in 2005.
3 Indonesia saw a reduction of official mercury imports in recent years despite the
concurrent rise in gold mining activity. However, the official tracking of mercury imports,
as stressed elsewhere (Balifokus, 2015; Ismawati, 2014), often masks the actual unofficial
mercury trade dynamics.
4 At the time of the interview, Darma explained that he was about to sell 20 t of
mercury.
5 Interviewee with small-scale gold miner, April 2017.
6 Metro TV news covered a multi-part series on this, available to view here: http://
video.metrotvnews.com/metro-realitas/8koX3pWK-racun-merkuri-made-in-sukabumi-1
In this report, mercury content in cinnabar (obtained from Seram) is said to be 40–60%
and furnaces in cinnabar processing sites in Parakansalak village are described as ha-
zardous places while also providing sources of livelihood.
7 These new mercury production dynamics are partly why “In 2016, Indonesia became
one of the largest mercury producers and exporters in the world, exporting 635 tons of
mercury to 13 countries” (Balifokus, 2017, p. 5).
8 If this interviewee is correct, this mercury trade would be illegal since both Germany
and Spain are in the EU which has an export ban.
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Partly, they reasoned, that this is because there are more mercury dealers
now (along with an increase in gold mining activity), thus raising compe-
tition, but mainly it arises due to the fact that there are now two different
kinds of mercury on the market, namely internationally imported mercury
and domestically mined mercury (which is believed to be of inferior
quality), with the more expensive imported mercury being used to process
high quality ore and the cheaper domestic mercury being used for low
quality ore.
Beyond Maluku's cinnabar mining (and affiliated mercury processing in
Jakarta and other cities in Java), interviewees involved in small-scale gold
mining reported that there have been new mercury supplies from cinnabar
mining elsewhere in Indonesia. For example, YTS staff training gold miners
in East Java to phase out hazardous practices of mercury use received in-
formation that cinnabar comes from West Kalimantan and Aceh.
Additionally, training staff received information that cinnabar is traded
through Tulung Agung in East Java and that mercury ore is transported to
Tirtomoyo district (and Purworejo) where it is processed into elemental
mercury for use in ASGM. They further noted that the resulting local mer-
cury product is sold more cheaply than imported mercury, as the quality is
considered to be lower than imported mercury there as well. In several
ASGM training sites selected for YTS capacity-building activities, the in-
creased cinnabar mining was the unambiguous cause for the recent drop in
the price of mercury, and experiences suggest that domestically produced
“cheap new mercury” is connected to increased mercury use and pollution,
particularly considering the widespread belief among gold miners that using
excess mercury will lead to more gold recovery. Past studies note that
Indonesia's ASGM operations use more mercury per gram of gold than al-
most any other country.9
At a Minamata Convention National Action Planning workshop in
Jakarta in September 2015, the production of new mercury from cinnabar
mined inWest Kalimantan was one of the subjects addressed by government
authorities.10 NGOs expressed the concern that domestic mercury manu-
facturing could be taking place at considerable scale and that mercury from
domestic production is being sold to gold miners in several provinces.
Government officials from the Ministry of Minerals and Energy noted that
no permits for cinnabar mining had been given from national mining au-
thorities – though district government authorities are often disconnected
from national authorities in how they manage mining, and some inter-
viewees noted that regional politicians could have interests in the cinnabar
production. Importantly, Indonesia signed the Minamata Convention in
2013 but it is not yet ratified; thus cinnabar mining is not yet prohibited, as
the Convention only restricts “new” - not pre-existing - mining of mercury:
“Each Party shall not allow primary mercury mining that was not being
conducted within its territory at the date of entry into force of the Con-
vention…” (Article 3.3), allowing already-existing mercury mining to con-
tinue “for a period of up to fifteen years” (Article 3.4). This “grand-father”
clause (heavily contested by environmentalists) could result in significant
ongoing mercury use from domestically mined mercury, a loophole that
could yield devastating pollution costs.
In 2017, commenting on the inter-governmental negotiations that
shaped the Convention, an environmental official noted “even though
there is a 15-year grandfather clause, primary mined mercury cannot be
used in ASGM immediately upon entry into force. This is an important
point that these new primary miners are missing” (interviewee's em-
phasis in italics, interviewed, January 16, 2017). This interviewee re-
flected on the history of the inter-governmental negotiations around the
‘grandfather clause’ – noting that this clause was “largely a concession
to China to support their VCM [vinyl chloride monomer] production”
while also cautioning that countries with new mercury mining could
have a “rude awakening” when the Convention enters into force (after
being ratified) as this trade of mercury to ASGM would immediately
become illegal. Indeed, Lennett and Gutierrez (2015), in their manual
on ratification, likewise stressed that countries that wish to make use of
Article 3.4 need to be aware that, upon ratification, “Mercury produced
from existing mines cannot be used for ASGM, since ASGM is not in-
cluded among the allowed uses for this mercury specified in paragraph
4 of Article 3.” In Indonesia, there has been significant scepticism - and
doubt - from all stakeholders (including many government officials)
about whether there is sufficient capacity in national, provincial and
district government agencies to implement these regulatory measures.
Moreover, there has been considerable doubt that any ban on mercury
mining (whether immediate, over a 15-year period or otherwise) would
be effective if there continues to be a strong demand for mercury.
5. From “Free Mercury” to the Ecological Economics of Adopting
Cleaner Technology: Engaging Socioeconomic and Power
Dynamics
The recent increase in inexpensive mercury from local cinnabar
mining made available to the ASGM sector in Indonesia is part of a
wider story of a changing social metabolism for mercury; whereas the
cinnabar production speaks to the ‘supply’ side, the ‘demand’ side of the
story is marked by highly uneven socioeconomic processes and power
dynamics within the ASGM sector itself that are driving on-going
mercury demand. The data gathered at the YTS training sites showed
that the price of mercury paid by small-scale miners varied con-
siderably from site to site and situation to situation while the socio-
economic relationships of ASGM also varied considerably.
In an ASGM site in Kebonsari in East Java, mercury prices ranged
from Rp 600,000 per kg ($45.00 USD) for high quality (imported
mercury) to Rp 250,000 ($18.75) per kg for low quality (domestic)
mercury. Most miners in Kebonsari were found to spend somewhere
between Rp 197,000 to Rp 244,000 ($14.78 to $18.30 USD) on mercury
per month. In one case in Central Java, others used imported mercury
purchased at Rp. 800,000 ($60.00 USD) per kg (village of Paningkaban,
in the district of Banyumas, Central Java). Notably, these findings are
considerably different from the ASGM situation in Suriname that
Heemskerk (2001) described 15 years ago – a situation where mercury
prices were deemed relatively insignificant in the overall picture of
production costs. In the case of Kebonsari, although small 100 g parcels
of mercury could be purchased in a local village store, most miners
bought their mercury several kilograms at a time, from bulk suppliers.
Large differences in mercury use can often be attributed to different
scales of mining and processing capacity in each village as well as
differences in the nature of the processing. Also, though, when people
are dealing with higher grades of gold in the ore or believe they are (in
hard rock), they use more mercury.11 The amount of mercury used, and
emitted into the environment, however, is not only influenced by the
9 According to a report released by Balifokus (2015), some studies in Indonesia show
that miners used “up to 60 g of mercury per gram of gold produced” – considerably higher
than what other studies have found – “5–10 g of mercury per gram gold produced” (IPEN,
2015, p. 11).
10 It should also be noted that in the years leading up to the negotiations for the
Minamata Convention on Mercury in 2013, UNEP facilitated a range of policy workshops
that focused on existing mercury mining in other countries. In particular, a primary
mercury mine in Kyrgyzstan that was recognized by UNEP as “the only operation which
supplies primary mined mercury to the global market place.” UNEP reports also discussed
other countries' mercury mining – albeit not Indonesia, which was not identified as a
significant mercury mining country at the time – while noting that Slovenia and Algeria
had ceased operations due to economic and technical challenges, while mercury mining
in Spain “experienced pressure from growing international concern regarding mercury
pollution which led to closure of this, the biggest mercury mine in the world in 2004.”
China's mercury mining was also discussed by UNEP in global mercury policy workshops,
though it was believed China's mercury largely remains within China rather than being
traded internationally (UNEP, 2009). One of the authors in our study visited mercury
mines in Mexico in 2017, finding that mercury production in the province of Queretaro
involves 1000 miners, producing nearly 300 t per annum of Hg, which is exported to
other countries in Latin America.
11 The greater use of mercury/tromol/day seems associated with expectations of
greater recovery of gold: it was estimated by miners we interviewed that 20 times the
mercury = 4 times more gold.
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scale of operation and geological factors, but also by key economic
dynamics around gold processing; these economic dynamics around
gold processing are, meanwhile, profoundly shaped by land use con-
flicts and challenges in legalising ASGM, which can hinder efforts at
forming cooperatives to facilitate uptake of cleaner technologies. Also
mercury suppliers/gold dealers/processors often have interests in
keeping workers in small-scale mining sites using mercury precisely
because it is inefficient, leaving gold in tailings and keeping them in
debt to the financiers. A simplified schematic rendering of the social
metabolism of mercury in ASGM in Indonesia, taking into account these
inter-related parts, is depicted in Fig. 1.
As shown in Fig. 1, mercury is often used both in “home and
backyard” small-scale mineral processing activities as well as in more
capital-intensive processing centres, frequently in conjunction with
cyanidation methods, to extract gold. Globally in the ASGM sector there
are an increasing number of processing centres with cyanidation plants
that purport to phase out mercury use - and break the vicious cycle that
is depicted in Fig. 1 - but we found that these often in fact first use
mercury to recover the easily extractable gold, and then cyanide to
extract the residual gold, as other studies have also noted elsewhere
(Veiga et al., 2014b; Drace et al., 2016). To replace mercury amalga-
mation, many international donors often promote the “scaling up” of
technology solutions that seem to work in one region, sometimes seeing
a combination of (often expensive) mercury-free extraction technology
and microfinance loans to be the solution for artisanal miners. How-
ever, we observed that many ASGM activities in Indonesia involve
poorer miners, whereas processing centres promoted by government
agencies or donors are often expensive and only suitable for certain
types of ore. As Sulaiman et al. (2006) noted several years ago, there
has been an “incomplete transition” from mercury amalgamation to
cyanidation methods in Indonesia when foreign donors funded a swift
technology transfer effort in a region where miners were not prepared
to stop mercury use. As noted by Veiga and colleagues, the end result of
such interventions is the use of mercury and cyanide together creating
an even more toxic pollution hazard (Veiga et al., 2014a, 2014b).
Several of the sites we studied included situations where cyanidation
and mercury were already used together as well as sites where cyanide
was not used. An ecological economics approach needs to recognize
that the geology, scale of operation, knowledge of risks and availability
of alternate technology are intricately linked not only to the economics
of mercury, but to socioeconomic and power relationships that can be
entrenched or that might change over time. In the sections below we
discuss particular contexts from YTS interventions seeking to phase out
mercury in ASGM, illustrating some of the issues at play.
5.1. Karang Jawa: Power Dynamics in a Combined Mercury-Cyanidation
Situation
In South Kalimantan, YTS training staff performed a detailed study
of the processing site of Karang Jawa, in Karang Taruna village in the
subdistrict of Pelaihari. At that time, the team collected baseline data
from respondents working as miners and processors and built re-
lationships with the staff at the subdistrict health clinic (Puskesmas). It
was found that miners had relatively high monthly incomes (when
compared with other miners in other ASGM sites), in the range of Rp.
3,000,000 to Rp. 5,000,000 ($225 to $375 USD) or more. Yet the data
collected from men and women exposed to amalgam burning activities
revealed that their overall level of knowledge about the dangers to their
health of their exposure to mercury was low, as was their awareness of
mercury-free alternative approaches to capturing gold. Risks associated
with combining use of mercury and cyanidation were also not known.
Having identified Karang Jawa as an important processing site, this lack
of risk awareness reinforced the intention of YTS to conduct interven-
tions at this location. However, after a careful analysis of the socio-
Fig. 1. Social metabolism* of mercury (Hg) supply and use in Indonesia's small-scale gold mining sector (a simplified rendering).
*Here we refer to inter-related processes, recognizing that this diagram is not comprehensive. Socioeconomic inequities that drive entry into ASGM as a livelihood are not shown in this diagram, nor
are the impacts of mercury use and cyanide use, which can produce negative social, economic and ecological costs (in mining regions and downstream). (For interpretation of the references to color
in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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economic relationships between the miners and processors, YTS staff
realized that establishing a centre at the Karang Jawa site could be
highly problematic; the main reason for this being that all of the pro-
cessing sheds at this location operate on a for-hire (rental) system
whereby the miners bring their own ore to the shed for processing by
the shed workers at no cost. In Karang Jawa, like in many other sites
across Indonesia in which YTS had conducted intervention projects,
owners of gold processing centres were providing mercury for free to
small-scale gold miners who processed their ore there – on condition
that miners leave their tailing waste behind. The tailing waste then
becomes the property of the processor, who uses a cyanidation process
to extract the residual gold that small-scale gold miners cannot obtain
by amalgamation at the first stage of gold recovery.
In this labour arrangement with free mercury supplies, little in-
centive exists for individual miners to reduce the utilization of large
quantities of mercury inside the tromols (grinding drums).12 As mer-
cury is highly inefficient at gold recovery (recovering only the free gold
particles), often less than 30% of the gold is extracted from the ore
during this process, meaning that the remaining gold becomes the
property of the processors. The introduction of a more efficient mer-
cury-free method - to extract most of the gold during the initial pro-
cessing run - would therefore be very detrimental to the business in-
terests of the processors operating on the ‘rental’ system. We observed
that there were also strong signs of involvement of the state's security in
ASGM activities, particularly at the cyanide installations in processing
centres and in the gold market. The analysis of the YTS training staff
was that successful project activities might also lead to the demise of
these business interests, as cyanide tank owners also reap their rewards
from the reprocessing of mercury-contaminated tailings.
Without a strong welcoming environment, the team members con-
cluded that it would be unwise to choose this location for a mercury-
free demonstration centre, despite the obvious need for an intervention
to prevent the high level of mercury emissions in the township. In June
2015, YTS decided to move the project to the village of Paningkaban in
the district of Banyumas in Central Java, where YTS had an existing
relationship with a miner's cooperative that had full control of the
mining and processing of their ore. YTS conducted action-research at
the site in response to a request from the District Mining Agency for
technical assistance. YTS staff, working with the miner's cooperative (in
Igir Salak in Paningkaban village) and one local champion from Cihonje
Village, conducted three mercury-free processing runs, and produced
30 kg of concentrate, which, on careful analysis, confirmed that it was
indeed possible to upgrade the concentrate sufficiently at this site to
allow for smelting of the super-concentrate as an alternative to using
mercury and cyanide.13 The story here – a natural experiment - thus
highlights that it is not only the question of technology choices but also
the existing socio-economics and daunting power dynamics that will
determine the success or failure of any mercury phase-out endeavour.
5.2. Jendi: Complexities of “Collective” Planning Amidst Land Conflict and
Without Licenses
YTS research in the Wonogiri regency of Central Java brought for-
ward a different set of dilemmas in pursuing strategies to phase out
mercury. In a very detailed study of ASGM practices in the village of
Jendi (Agrawal et al., 2014), YTS found 222 miners operating 741
tromols in the vicinity of their homes (Fig. 2). Miners pour mercury into
the tromols and, while most miners are aware of some degree of in-
efficiencies and mercury losses, whole ore amalgamation remains the
most common practice, simply because of the ease of operation and a
lack of other ready alternatives. YTS research explored the limited
choices miners felt they had for primary recovery of gold, finding that it
is only when the miners are willing to give up their control over the
processing of their ore that a wider range of more sophisticated tech-
nologies becomes available to them. While miners can make significant
reductions in mercury use/release by using simple gravity concentra-
tion prior to amalgamation, almost all sophisticated technologies to
eliminate mercury are relatively unaffordable to the average miner.
Thus, if miners are to stop using mercury, they have three choices - use
gravity methods to obtain their gold themselves; sell their ore (or ore
concentrate) to a dealer or owner of a sophisticated facility (where it
would likely be leached it with cyanide); or, as Saldarriaga-Isaza et al.
(2015a, 2015b) showed was a desirable option, form a “collective” in
which a group of miners could pool their resources to switch to a more
expensive but environmentally friendlier mercury-free gold extraction
process. As Saldarriaga-Isaza and colleagues explain, this third option
can take the form of a cooperative – an idea that was, for many small-
scale miners in Jendi, highly desirable. Indeed the value system dis-
played by miners was (contrary to popular media portrayals of miners
as individualistic) welcoming to ideas of cooperative mining and col-
lective stewardship.
We found that the average miner in this study site owns three or
four tromols and operates continually at the back of the house, allowing
miners to have full control over their own ore, even though this means
Fig. 2. Tromols for mercury amalgamation at homes in Jendi.
Photo source: authors.
12 In some small-scale gold extraction processes in Karang Jawa approximately 20 g of
mercury are emitted into the environment per day per tromol to produce 1 g of gold– a
dangerous practice that exceeds the amounts used and lost in many other ASGM contexts.
13 We stress that there is no one-size-fits-all ‘silver bullet’ solution and that initiatives
aiming to reduce or eliminate mercury need to be carefully informed by local labour
dynamics and local geology (among other factors). In various sites where gold is very fine,
past assessments suggest that without mercury or cyanide, gold recovery could be very
low, as was tested in the UNIDO/GEF/UNDP Global Mercury Project in Talawaan.
Globally, some technical training projects encourage the idea of selling ores to cyanida-
tion companies rather than processing (using gravity or other processing methods) (see
Veiga et al., 2015).
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that to extract full value from their ore requires additional processing,
the cheapest and easiest being using mercury. Small-scale miners were
asked by the research team what it would take to transition from
mercury-using backyard processing to collective mercury-free proces-
sing. In such a scenario, the ore or concentrate would be purchased
from the miners (at prices that would have to be collectively de-
termined in a trusting relationship), then milled and processed on-site
to recover most of the gold content using mercury-free alternatives.
Such a collective processing facility could operate at the community-
scale or at the commercial-scale; whereas a company-run facility might
have the capacity to process 10 t of ore per day, a community-run fa-
cility would have a one-tonne capacity at most but would provide the
community with a model as to how to end the problem of mercury use
and waste dumping.14 Indicative costs for establishing such a facility
were subsequently discussed with donors and government officials by
YTS staff following discussions with community stakeholders in the
Jendi small-scale mining site; estimated costs based on a projected 0.2 t
of gold production/per day facility were 1176 million Rupiah ($88,328
USD), and 6360 million Rupiah ($477,692 USD), for a larger facility
with 1 t gold production/day. In presenting the potential benefits to the
government, YTS staff also explained that, among the various other
potential benefits for miners, if miners were to sell their rock (to a
processing centre) rather than run their tromols, they could reduce their
household expenses for electricity and water by an average of 300,000
Rupiah per month ($22.51 USD). Moreover, they would no longer need
to purchase any mercury - a cost often of another 300,000 Rupiah per
month – spent just on mercury. Taken together, these costs can be
significant portions of revenues generated from backyard gold pro-
duction. Yet, major challenges encountered in the fieldwork - that
stymied the implementation of the desired approach - centred on sig-
nificant power interests; in addition to the vested interests in keeping
the existing processing centres operating and exploiting the small-scale
miners in an “informal” (i.e. non-legalised) arrangement, land use
conflict with a company in the area (over the rights to mine) made
future planning difficult for the mining community. The artisanal and
small-scale miners did not have formal licenses, despite having at-
tempted to acquire licenses. Although Danish donors were prepared to
support significant funding to conduct technology interventions and to
support cooperative structures, the government decided not to desig-
nate the area for a “Community Mining Zone” (WPR – Wilayah Per-
tambangan Rakyat) and instead give the license to a private company.
This decision in the Jendi village context is reflective of a much
wider problem of resource rights allocation that undermines sound
environmental management in Java as well as nationally. Central
government mining authorities have reported that only approximately
90 zones have been designated for “community mining” across the
country – although government licenses to mine have been issued in
only a small fraction of these.15 Operating widely in contexts with in-
secure land claims presents challenges for local environmental/liveli-
hood planning, as the experience in Jendi illustrated – pollution risk
reduction campaigns can be significantly limited by the extensive lack
of resource rights. While declaring their commitment to be free from
mercury by 2018, the National Indonesian Association of Community
Miners has argued that responsible community mining would only be
possible once legal issues are resolved. Small-scale gold miners in Jendi
have repeatedly made efforts to make their activities legal – through
advocacies to the district as well as provincial and national government
authorities (and through requests made to YTS for help with facilitating
dialogue with the government) – but to date these efforts have not been
met with new small-scale mining legalisation opportunities. Small-scale
gold miners in the study area have also voiced frustration with mercury
risk-“awareness” efforts in Jendi, where government mercury pro-
grammes have narrowly focused on health impacts of mercury, warning
against using mercury for gold processing without offering feasible al-
ternatives.
5.3. Synthesizing the Importance of Addressing the Socioeconomics and
Power Relations
Although campaigns to raise awareness of ecological and health
risks in ASGM sites can be important, we found that unless closely
linked to addressing socioeconomic barriers to technology transfer and
concrete efforts to minimise mercury use, such campaigns can have the
effect of stigmatizing miners without reducing mercury use and pollu-
tion. To give one example of this, some miners in Jendi expressed an-
noyance after a government-led health awareness event that offered no
feasible alternatives to mercury use. Our findings also support the view
that narrow emphasis on contamination can also have the effect of
exacerbating social tensions between miners and others in society – a
point made by Tschakert and Singha (2007) in addressing mercury
pollution debates in Ghana's ASGM sector, where discourses of con-
tamination have contributed to the “criminalization” discourses that
marginalise miners. Furthermore, issues of governance coordination
across ministries and implementation agencies are nested in political
complexities that require careful attention. In a past issue of Ecological
Economics, Gallemore et al. (2015) discussed governance and transac-
tion costs in Indonesia associated with REDD+ (Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), explaining how co-
ordination across governmental levels has been weak and how local
organisations' efforts to get access to different agencies are subject to
power imbalances. Experience of YTS in the context of planning for
Minamata Convention implementation highlighted that many govern-
ment authorities must be involved at national, regional and district
levels. Notably, the fieldwork in 2016 occurred in a transition period in
which government powers over licensing for mining were being shifted
from district to provincial government levels, generating much confu-
sion and concerns that achieving ‘legal’ status was becoming more
difficult.
In North Sulawesi, East Indonesia, Langston et al. (2015) noted that
small-scale gold mining contributes more to the local economy than
large-scale mining and that local impacts of large-scale mining are more
controversial in communities. They also document a case study where
mercury phase-out was possible. Nonetheless, while large-scale mining
operations have long ago phased out mercury use and while ASGM
operations in Indonesia have in some cases been able to do so, the
transition to mercury-free methods (including cyanidation) still often
requires more economic capital and training that most artisanal miners
can access – and requires a significant re-organisation of miners' labour
structure, involving different systems of payment and revenue sharing.
The Karang Jawa situation illustrated a labour relation set-up whereby
processing centre owners make their profit from the inefficiency of
mercury technology so much so that they are prepared to provide
mercury free of charge to de-incentivize any efforts to seek alternatives.
The lack of knowledge of the hazards of mercury to health and en-
vironment, let alone the existence of alternatives was stark, yet could
not be addressed by the intervention proposed by YTS because of the
financial arrangement between the miners and the owners of the capital
equipment needed to process the ore. The situation was particularly
difficult as it was not only the business interests of the owners of the
14 We found that most of the low-value tailings were being dumped into local water-
ways, whereas the higher-value tailings were being sold to regional buyers, thus
spreading the contamination problem widely throughout Java.
15 During one of the Minamata Convention National Action Plan workshops in
September 2015, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry presented a database on open
access lands gathered during the period 2010 to 2014, involving 302 ASM locations in 29
provinces (DKI Jakarta and Central Kalimantan were not included). An inventory was
performed that covered four aspects: (1) environmental damage, (2) ongoing and past
conflicts, (3) the wellbeing of community miners, including women and children (4) the
commitment of local government. The presentation noted that there are 92 districts
(Kabupaten) with WPR areas, but only 9 have been legally formalized. ASM locations are
dominated by gold mining, of which 202 are informal ASGM and only 44 locations have
some form of mining permit (IUP/IPR).
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primary processing step that stood in the way, but the capital for sec-
ondary processing – using cyanidation rested in the hands of powerful
actors. Efforts to phase out mercury in this situation would be daunting.
In contrast, in Paningkaban, the existence of cooperatives allowed the
promotion of mercury free technology to gain traction, supporting the
arguments by Saldarriaga-Isaza et al. (2015a, 2015b) on the importance
of cooperatives, even if other power interests came into play as barriers.
Technological transfer complexities also can be understood as en-
veloped within wider debate about how projects seeking to reduce
pollution are implemented (e.g. examined in other countries by Hilson
and McQuilken (2014) and Jønsson et al. (2013)), whether capacity-
building to address mercury can take place where artisanal miners
compete with large companies for land access (examined in other
country contexts by Spiegel, 2016). The Jendi study illustrated that
despite considerable interest in forming cooperatives and raising the
capital needed for mercury-free processing, the inability to obtain li-
censes to mine created an enduring barrier. Ultimately, there are many
different economic forecasts on what exactly is required to “phase out”
mercury. Veiga et al. (2014b) noted that a capital influx of about US$
10,000 per tonne of ore being processed per day is needed to establish a
cleaner and profitable processing facility. As small-scale miners are not
all “capitalists-in-waiting,” the capital needed for a complete mercury
phase-out is – in the view of many small-scale miners –well out of reach
of individuals, leaving informal ‘backyard’ mercury processing to
flourish. While costs associated with forming cooperative businesses are
not insignificant (we encountered cases, such as in West Java, where
small-scale miners had banded together to form cooperatives prior to
advocating for small-scale mining licenses), the costs and bureaucratic
complexities associated with acquiring licenses and meeting regulatory
requirements (including environmental permits) are considerably
greater, and sometimes require paying the equivalent of thousands of
US dollars and waiting for many months. Fig. 1′s depiction of the “so-
cial metabolism” of mercury along the commodity chain thus re-
cognizes that such regulatory costs are essential to address, along with
relations of production, and perhaps most importantly – at least from
the perspective of small-scale mining associations - is the dispossession
and land use policies that prevent the legalisation and regulation of
ASGM activities. These concerns underline the need to engage miners in
participatory planning that includes respecting their rights to mine –
safely and in an ecologically sound manner, if the goal of phasing out
mercury is to realized.
6. Concluding Remarks
Literature in the field of ecological economics has tended to discuss
the gold mining sector by focusing on friction between large-scale gold
mining companies and affected communities (Urkidi and Walter, 2011;
Anguelovski and Alier, 2014; Avcı et al., 2010). When engaging the
ASGM sector, also the source of considerable environmental concern, a
vastly different sort of approach is required. While the full cost of health
and ecological damage associated with mercury mining and gold
mining cannot be ignored, government policymakers, like the news
media, have had a tendency to promote ecological cost assessments and
awareness raising (of miners and the public) about toxic risks, as the
main strategy to address mercury's mounting ecological costs. However,
unless policymakers and researchers adopt a more comprehensive
ecological economics approach that recognizes and addresses the
complex social metabolism involved in the ASGM-mercury story, such
efforts to phase out mercury are unlikely to achieve significant results.
First and foremost, we conclude there is a need for researchers and
policymakers to come together to discuss the economic and ecological
dynamics of cinnabar (mercury) mining, including links between do-
mestic mercury production, mercury pricing, and on-going mercury use
practices, as well as potential plans for closing down mercury mines –
and providing alternative livelihoods. Because past ‘hopes’ about re-
stricting international mercury trade (i.e. that this would lead to
increased mercury prices and reduced mercury use) have not been
realized, new approaches for curtailing and reversing Indonesia's recent
increases in mercury production should be made policy priorities. As
Indonesian policymakers and researchers contemplate how to respond
to the recent development of at least hundreds of tonnes of domestic
mercury production per year, other case studies around the world offer
useful points of comparison. For example, the Indonesian case study
described here resonates with what Camacho et al. (2016) found in
Mexico where “informal mercury mining” increased ten fold between
2014 and 2016, with mercury exported to ASGM locations across Latin
America. Camacho and colleagues called for state support for alter-
native livelihoods to mercury mining, to support communities for
whom employment prospects are critically limited. In Maluku, the
mercury mining area we discussed in this study, many of the approxi-
mately 3000 mercury miners were formerly small-scale gold miners –
before they were forced out of gold mining. This case thus underlines
the importance of understanding not only technology and trade issues
but also complex regional labour dynamics, which are vital to engage
when planning a phase-out of mercury production. As noted by others
elsewhere (Spiegel, 2009; Spiegel, 2015; Hilson, 2006) as well as by
Suhartini and Abubakar (2017) in Indonesia, treating small-scale gold
mining as “illegal” can have counterproductive ecological con-
sequences. Our study has emphasized the importance of appreciating
the interconnectedness of trade, labour dynamics and environmental
implications when assessing the ecological economics of mercury and
gold mining. A chief implication of understanding this interconnected-
ness is that researchers need to advocate for inter-sectoral approaches
working with policymakers and diverse population groups including
those involved in key extractive labour practices, creating carefully
informed understandings of what a viable “socioecological transition”
(see Fischer-Kowalski, and Haberl, H. (Eds.)., 2007) may mean in
practice. This entails making efforts to “try to distinguish possible from
impossible futures” (Martinez-Alier, 2009, p. 64) by recognizing diverse
knowledge that people in mining areas can bring forward.
Secondly, we have also highlighted how mercury use practices are
uneven and driven by complex multi-scalar power relations, such that
academics need to resist attempts at ‘simplifying’ the social metabolism
of the extractive sector with overgeneralized and abstract ideas about
small-scale (and artisanal) gold miners' economic capacities. We have
shown that the assumption that education and training programmes are
the keys to implementing technology changes risks neglecting powerful
interests at play that mitigate against changing the status quo in gold
extraction techniques, at the local level of processing plants and at re-
gional and national levels in terms of access to land and licenses. Our
findings reinforce the call by Saldarriaga-Isaza et al., 2015a for sup-
porting local cooperatives and collective solutions by small-scale gold
miners, including external policy measures designed to address equity
issues. Long-term community-based approaches, based on sustained
trust-building relationships, are needed to engage those who are al-
ready seen as ‘influential’ in the communities (including owners of
equipment, traders and land owners) as well as those who might not
(yet) be seen locally as having the same kind of power. In the case of
gold mining in Wonogiri, small-scale miners groups continued to make
further requests for support several months after the intervention we
examined – from donors and government officials - in efforts to acquire
mining licenses and reduce mercury use. Locally engaged ecological
economics research that takes into account the longue durée of equity
struggles is crucial.
Finally, before the signing of the Minamata Convention, Andresen
et al. (2013) discussed some of the perspectives of treaty negotiators
who felt there was a need to leverage “more predictable funding” (p.
437) for treaty implementation. In 2014, the Global Environment Fa-
cility (GEF) announced that the GEF6 replenishment set aside $141
million for actions to implement the Minamata Convention, an amount
that includes ASGM-related assessment and intervention activities,
among other sectors. Indonesia's government is one of many worldwide
S.J. Spiegel et al. Ecological Economics 144 (2018) 1–11
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that have received funds for assistance from the GEF since then. Gov-
ernment authorities are faced with the task of deciding priorities out of
the dozens of activities outlined in the Minamata Convention - ranging
from measuring mercury exposure levels to diagnosing health and
ecosystem impacts, to designing disposal strategies, reviewing mining
policies and providing training on mercury-free and mercury-reducing
technologies. Different stakeholders, not surprisingly, have competing
views regarding which of the above are the more urgent funding
priorities. Our study leads to the conclusion that, along with funding
community initiatives, the complex political and economic incentives,
including the role of powerful interests involved with the security ap-
paratus of the state, that drive mercury trade and mercury use, must be
addressed if the trust needed to protect the environment as a public
good is to be restored. Going well beyond narrow technological solu-
tions, an ecological economics approach that addresses power re-
lationships and dilemmas of collective planning - closely engaging
changing realities and equity concerns within dynamic extractive sec-
tors - is needed to drive the phasing out of mercury.
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